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CLD-043        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4540 
___________ 
 
HOWARD WASHINGTON WOOD, 
                          Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                           Respondent  
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A035-605-271) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Charles M. Honeyman 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 5, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 18, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se petitioner Howard Washington Wood petitions for review of the order of 
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen.  The Government 
has filed a motion for summary disposition, arguing that Wood’s case presents no 
substantial question.  We will grant the Government’s motion and deny the petition for 
review in part and dismiss it in part. 
 Wood is a citizen of Jamaica.  He entered the United States in 1978.  In 1994, 
Wood pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or 
more of cocaine and 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, 
and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.  See United States v. Wood, 48 F.3d 530 (5th 
Cir. 1995).1  In 2000, the INS charged Wood with being removable because he had been 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 Wood appeared before an Immigration Judge (IJ), who found him removable as 
charged.  Citing the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 
289 (2001), the IJ specifically concluded that Wood was not eligible for discretionary 
relief under the version of § 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(c), that was in force at the time he pleaded guilty because he had served more 
than five years in prison.  See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, § 511(a), 
104 Stat. 4978 (amending § 212(c) to render it inapplicable to “an alien who has been 
convicted of an aggravated felony and has served a term of imprisonment of at least 5 
                                              
1 It appears that Wood’s sentence has recently been reduced to 262 months’ 
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years”).  Wood appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which affirmed 
without issuing an opinion.   
 In 2014, Wood filed a motion to reopen with the BIA.  He argued that his 
proceedings before the IJ had been fundamentally unfair because the IJ had not provided 
him with an opportunity to seek discretionary relief based on pre-1996 versions of the 
immigration laws.  See generally St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 297 (discussing the changes to the 
immigration laws wrought by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA)).  The BIA denied the motion to reopen.  The BIA first concluded that the 
motion was untimely.  Moreover, the BIA concluded that the “motion does not 
demonstrate an exceptional situation that would warrant the exercise of our discretion to 
reopen these proceedings under our sua sponte authority.”  A.R. at 2.  Wood filed a 
timely petition for review, and has asked the Court to stay his removal.  The Government 
has filed a motion for summary action.   
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  We review a denial of a motion 
to reopen for abuse of discretion, and will not disturb the BIA’s decision “unless it is 
‘arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.’”  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
                                                                                                                                                  
imprisonment. 
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 As the BIA concluded, Wood’s motion was plainly untimely.  A motion to reopen 
must generally be filed within 90 days of the removal order, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Wood filed the motion at issue here 
more than a decade after the BIA entered the final order in his case.  There are various 
exceptions to this deadline — including (1) in certain circumstances if the order was 
entered in absentia, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(i); (2) if the motion is filed for the purpose of 
applying “for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed country 
conditions,” § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); (3) if the motion is jointly filed by the parties, 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(iii); or (4) if the Government files the motion, § 1003.2(c)(3)(iv) — but 
none of those exceptions applies here.  Therefore, the BIA did not err in concluding that 
the motion was time-barred. 
 Moreover, we generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision declining to 
exercise its discretion to reopen the case.  See Calle–Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 
475 (3d Cir. 2003).  We have recognized two exceptions: we may consider whether the 
BIA’s decision “is based on a false legal premise,” Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160, or whether 
the BIA has “restricted the exercise of its discretion by establishing a ‘general policy’ of 
reopening sua sponte” under specific circumstances, Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 
249 (3d Cir. 2006).  Neither exception applies here.  The BIA did not rely on a false legal 
premise, and Wood has not established that the BIA maintains a “general policy” of 
reopening sua sponte when aliens seek to advance previously available legal arguments 
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more than ten years after the removal order was issued.2  We thus lack jurisdiction to 
review the BIA’s refusal to reopen the matter sua sponte.   
 Accordingly, we grant the Government’s motion for summary action and will 
deny the petition for review in part and dismiss it in part.  We also deny Wood’s motion 
for a stay of removal.  See generally In re Revel AC, Inc., -- F.3d ---, C.A. No. 15-1253, 
2015 WL 5711358, at *11 (3d Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).   
 
 
 
                                              
2 Indeed, we note that Wood raised a similar argument to the one he raises now in his 
initial appeal to the BIA, where he argued that IIRIRA should not apply to him because 
he had pleaded guilty before the statute’s enactment.  Wood also presents a complicated 
argument based on Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011), in which the Supreme 
Court concluded that the BIA’s use of the comparable-grounds rule to assess eligibility 
for relief under § 212(c) was arbitrary and capricious.  Id. at 484.  Insofar as the BIA did 
not employ the comparable-grounds rule in Wood’s case, Judulang’s relevance is not 
immediately apparent, but in any event, because Wood did not present this claim to the 
BIA in the first instance, we lack jurisdiction to consider it.  See Castro v. Att’y Gen., 
671 F.3d 356, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). 
